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Abstract: The agency model is a business format used by online digital platform providers
(such as Apple and Google) in which retail pricing decisions are delegated to upstream
content providers subject to a xed revenue-sharing rule. In a non-cooperative setting with
competition both upstream and downstream, we show that the agency model can lead to
higher or lower retail prices depending on the rmsrevenue-sharing splits and the relative
substitution between goods and between platforms. Even if industry-wide adoption of the
agency model would lead to higher prots for all rms, there may be equilibria in which it
is not universally adopted. Most-favored-nation clauses (used by Apple in the controversial
e-books case) can be used in such settings to increase retail prices and induce adoption.
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April 2013 for helpful comments. A previous version of this paper was circulated under the title Turning
the Page on Business Formats for Digital Platforms: Does Apples Agency Model Soften Competition.
1 Introduction
The agency model is often adopted by online digital platform providers (such as Apple
and Google) in their dealings with upstream content providers (such as e-book publishers
and app developers).2 This business model has two key ingredients. The rst is that the
downstream platforms delegate retail pricing decisions to the upstream content providers.
The second is that the platform providers are compensated via a xed revenue-sharing rule.
Thus, for example, Rovio Entertainment controls the retail price of its popular game Angry
Birds, and Apple keeps 30% of the revenue created on each sale made on its platform.3
The pricing aspect of the agency model is, in economic terms, similar to resale price
maintenance (RPM), about which much has been written. What is unusual about the
agency model, however, is that it is the downstream rms  not the upstream rms 
who decide whether to use RPM. This has led to controversy, in part because little is known
about the competitive e¤ects of the agency model, or why the agency model is adopted.
Notably, the usual (procompetitive) explanations for RPM do not apply. For example,
it has been alleged in other contexts that RPM can reduce free-riding on pre-sale services
(Telser, 1960), stimulate inter-brand competition by providing quality certication (Mar-
vel and McCa¤erty, 1984) or by fostering demand-enhancing activities (Mathewson and
Winter, 1984; Winter 1993) and ensure that downstream rms have su¢ cient margins to
maintain adequate supplies of inventory (Deneckere et al., 1996; Krishnan and Winter,
2007). But these explanations have no bite when it is the downstream rms who are de-
ciding whether to adopt the agency model (to prevent free-riding on a retailers pre-sale
services, for example, RPM has to be imposed on the downstream rms that want to free
ride; it cannot be an option for them).4 Moreover, the role of the agency model cannot be
to mitigate the well-known problem of double marginalization because there is no double-
2The agency model is also used by other online platforms, including eBay and Amazon Marketplace,
and by mobile operators in the market for mobile content messages (see Foros et al., 2009).
3Apples 70/30 revenue split is xed in advance (non-negotiable) and the same for all content providers.
Thus, for example, News Corp (Murdoch) does not obtain a better deal than a small, insignicant e-book
publisher or app developer (see Isaacson, 2011, and United States v. Apple Inc, 12 Civ. 2826 (DLC)).
Google and other online platforms also employ a straight 70/30 revenue split (although Google used to
have an 80/20 split). One exception is the split Microsoft uses for apps at its Windows Store. It starts out
with a 70/30 split, but then goes to 80/20 if the apps sales exceed $25,000 (Marketing Week, 2011).
4Similarly, to prevent undercutting of the rm that is providing the quality certication, or to preserve
downstream prot margins in order to maintain adequate incentives to carry inventory, RPM must be
imposed on retailers. One cannot allow each retailer to decide on its own whether it wants to have RPM.
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marginalization problem when rms engage in revenue sharing and, as is likely to be the
case with digital products, the marginal costs of distribution are zero or close to zero.
The agency model is also controversial because of the recent investigations in the U.S.
and Europe into Apples use of the agency model on e-books.5 Although Apple and Google
both adopted the agency model without raising signicant concerns from antitrust author-
ities when the rst smartphones were introduced in 2008, this changed when Apple entered
the e-books market in 2010. In lings made by the U.S. Department of Justice in 2012, it
was asserted that Apples agency model in conjunction with certain clauses (see below) in
its contracts had resulted in higher retail prices for consumers. It was also asserted that the
rapid industry-wide adoption of the agency model after Apple entered the e-books market
was the result of collusion between Apple and the ve largest book publishers in the U.S.6
Lastly, the agency model is controversial because the contracts often contain most-
favored-nation (MFN) clauses that restrict the retail price at which the upstream rms can
o¤er their goods for sale. It is, for example, known from Apples use of the agency model
on e-books that it had an MFN clause that prevented book publishers from selling their
e-books at higher retail prices on Apples iBookstore than they were sold for elsewhere.7
In this paper, we allow for both upstream and downstream competition, where the
upstream rms serve all downstream rms. We consider the downstream rmsincentives
to delegate pricing control to the upstream rms, and we ask the following three questions:
1. when will the agency model lead to higher prices?
2. when will the agency model be adopted?
3. what is the role of MFN clauses?
Our benchmark is revenue-sharing arrangements in which the downstream rms retain
control of the retail prices.8 Moreover, we conduct our analysis in a static non-cooperative
5Documents from the European Commissions proceedings in the e-books investigation are available at
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=l_39847. See the OFT press
release (29 August 2013): http://www.oft.gov.uk/news-and-updates/press/2013/60-13#.Umj2_PmSwTk.
6The judge in the e-books case ruled that Apple was guilty of conspiring with the publishers to x
e-books prices. A key issue was whether Amazon was pressured into using the agency model, or whether
it would have adopted the agency model anyway. See United States v. Apple, 12 Civ. 2826 (DLC).
7United States v. Apple, 12 Civ. 2826 (DLC), July 10, 2013. The MFN guaranteed that the e-books
in Apples e-bookstore would be sold for the lowest retail price available in the marketplace.p.47.
8This allows us to isolate the e¤ects of the delegation without changing the way rms are compensated.
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setting. Thus, for example, we do not allow RPM to be used by powerful retailers to
facilitate a retail cartel (as in Yamey, 1954), nor do we allow RPM to be used by rms to
facilitate tacit collusion when retail prices are observable (as in Jullien and Rey, 2007).
In answer to our rst question, we nd that delegating pricing control to the upstream
rms may lead to higher or lower retail prices depending on whether the platformsrevenue-
sharing splits are the same or di¤erent, and whether the willingness of consumers to substi-
tute between goods is higher or lower than their willingness to substitute between platforms.
In particular, we show that a platform that keeps a larger share of the revenue for itself will
have higher retail prices than its rival when both adopt the agency model. We also show
that retail prices will tend to be higher when both rms adopt the agency model than when
neither rm adopts it if substitution is relatively greater downstream. Thus, the agency
model is not intrinsically anticompetitive. Depending on substitution patterns, prices may
be higher or lower under the agency model. By giving control of the retail prices to the
upstream rms, the downstream platforms simply trade one type of pecuniary externality
(due to competition between platforms) for another (due to competition between goods).
In answer to our second question, we demonstrate that when the revenue splits are the
same for both platforms, all rms (upstream and downstream) benet from industry-wide
adoption of the agency model when it increases prices. However, this does not mean that
it will be adopted. We show that when the platform providers can choose whether or not
to adopt the agency model, multiple equilibria may arise. In particular, there may be a
prisoners dilemma in which each platform provider would have an incentive to deviate
from the agency model even when industry-wide adoption would lead to higher prices and
prots for all. There may also be equilibria in which no rm adopts the agency model.
Lastly, in answer to our third question, we nd that MFN clauses can be used to over-
come the prisoners dilemma that might otherwise arise. In particular, such clauses can
nudge the industry toward agency adoption (by making adoption a weakly dominant strat-
egy for the downstream platforms), thereby leading to higher prices than would otherwise
have been the case. Moreover, this is so even if only one platform provider has an MFN
clause, and even if the MFN clause has no e¤ect on the downstream rmsrevenue-sharing
Furthermore, Apple (among others) uses revenue-sharing also when they retain control of retail pricing.
When Apple established its iTunes store, for example, it declined to delegate pricing control to the upstream
rms, opting instead to o¤er each song for sale at a price of 99 cents. However, the 70/30 revenue split is
used for music as well as for apps and e-books (where the agency model is adopted). See Isaacson (2011).
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splits.9 Thus, we nd that rapid industry-wide adoption of the agency model may occur
naturally in practice, and need not be the result of pressurefrom the upstream rms.
Our analysis contributes to the vertical-contracting literature in several ways. First,
most models of vertical contracting assume either that one level (upstream or downstream)
is monopolized, or that each downstream rm sells only one upstream rms goods. In
contrast, we assume imperfect competition at both levels and allow each downstream rm
to sell multiple upstream rmsgoods. The papers by Lal and Villas-Boas (1998), Dobson
and Waterson (2007), Rey and Verge (2010), and Johnson (2013a,b) are similar to ours in
that regard. Of these, only Johnson allows the rms to engage in revenue sharing.10 Unlike
us, he adopts the wholesale model (compensation to the upstream rms is in the form of a
linear wholesale price) as his benchmark when analyzing the competitive e¤ects of RPM.
Second, we o¤er a new explanation for RPM in which the pricing e¤ects depend on
the rmsrevenue shares and whether competitive pressures are weaker upstream or down-
stream. We nd that RPM might, for instance, lead to lower retail prices even in the
absence of a double marginalization problem. In other settings, however, it can lead to
higher retail prices. This is so even in the absence of a cartel (Yamey, 1954; Jullien and
Rey, 2007), a rst-mover advantage by the rm or rms using RPM (Sha¤er, 1991; Foros
et al, 2011), a commitment to maintain higher retail markups (Rey and Verge, 2010), or a
potential entrant that threatens to enter and destroy surplus (Asker and Bar-Isaac, 2014).11
Third, we contribute to the literature on MFN clauses. It is well known that MFN
clauses can be used as a commitment device to raise prices in inter-temporal settings
(Cooper, 1986; Neilson and Winter, 1993; Schnitzer, 1994; Hviid and Sha¤er, 2012). It is
also well known that MFN clauses can lead to higher prices in bargaining settings in which
contracts are negotiated sequentially (Cooper and Fries, 1991; and Neilson and Winter,
1994). Closer to us, Johnson (2013b) suggests that MFN clauses can remove the platforms
incentives to provide higher revenue shares to content providers in order to induce a lower
9This is consistent with the stylized facts in the e-books case, where, for instance, the revenue-sharing
split that Apple used for e-books (where it had an MFN clause) was the same as the revenue-sharing split
that it used for music (where it did not adopt the agency model and thus did not have an MFN clause).
10In contrast to us, he nds that the upstream rms cannot benet from the agency model (without
MFN clauses), and that it always leads to lower retail prices relative to his wholesale model benchmark.
11Our analysis takes place in a non-cooperative, single-period setting, thus ruling out tacit or explicit
collusion as an explanation, and there is no potential entrant at the upstream level, thus ruling out the
concern in Asker and Bar-Isaac (2014). Moreover, there is no rst-mover advantage to exploit when some
rms adopt RPM and others do not, as in Sha¤er (1991) and Foros et al. (2011), and no manipulation of
the retail markups when both wholesale prices and xed fees are feasible, as in Rey and Verge (2010).
4
retail price (and a higher retail price for goods sold through the rivals platform). Although
this implication of MFN clauses also holds in our model, we nd that MFN clauses may in
addition adversely a¤ect prices even if they have no e¤ect on the rmsrevenue shares.
Fourth, we contribute to the literature on strategic delegation that has been inspired
by the works of McGuire and Staelin (1983), Moorthy (1988), Rey and Stiglitz (1988), and
Bonanno and Vickers (1988), among others. Typically, in this literature, rms commit to
taking an action which, if observable, dampens competition. The observable commitment
device in our setting is the delegation of pricing control to the upstream rms. Since this is
a discrete choice, unlike in the aforementioned papers in the strategic-delegation literature,
the delegation we consider is not always protable even when it would dampen competition.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the model. First, in
Section 2.1 we compare the retail prices that would arise when both rms adopt the agency
model with the retail prices that would arise when neither rm adopts the agency model.
In Section 2.2 we consider the adoption decisions of the downstream rms. In Section 2.3
we consider how MFN clauses impact adoption decisions and a¤ect prices. In Section 2.4
we discuss an initial stage - prior to the adoption stage - where the revenue-sharing splits
are endogenously determined. In Section 3 we conclude the paper. There we summarize
our ndings and discuss other factors that may a¤ect the platformsadoption incentives.
2 The Model
We consider a single-period setting in which there are two (upstream) content providers,
indexed by j = 1; 2, and two (downstream) platform providers, indexed by i = 1; 2. Each
downstream rm sells the goods of both upstream rms. We let the demand for good j
(superscripts on variables) at downstream rm i (subscripts on variables) be given by:
xji = q
j
i (p
1
1; p
2
1; p
1
2; p
2
2):
We assume that xji is decreasing in p
j
i (i.e., downward sloping) and weakly increasing in
each of the other prices (i.e., the products are gross substitutes) whenever xji is positive. We
also assume that the demands are symmetric between the rms and between the goods.12
12Formally, we assume that qji (a; b; c; d) = q
j
 i(c; d; a; b) and q
j
i (a; b; c; d) = q
 j
i (b; a; d; c), for i; j = 1; 2.
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Each downstream rm i keeps a share si 2 [0; 1] of the revenue it earns from selling
goods 1 and 2, and each upstream rm j gets 1   si share of the revenue Di earns from
selling good j. Thus, we assume that Di does not charge a di¤erent si to U1 than it does
to U2 (nor would it want to in our model given the assumed symmetry). Moreover, we
assume that the marginal costs of producing and distributing each good are zero. Writing
p = (p11; p
2
1; p
1
2; p
2
2), downstream rm is prot given its revenue share si is thus
Di = si
 
p1i q
1
i (p) + p
2
i q
2
i (p)

; (1)
and upstream rm js prot, which depends on both s1 and s2, is
Uj = (1  s1) pj1qj1(p) + (1  s2) pj2qj2(p): (2)
With respect to the timing of the game, we assume that prior to the determination of
retail prices, the downstream rms choose whether or not to delegate price setting to the
upstream rms. We also assume that the revenue shares, s1 and s2, are exogenously given
(alternatively, one can think of them as being determined prior to the downstream rms
decisions on delegation see Section 2.4 for further discussion on this). Finally, we assume
for now that the downstream rms do not use MFN clauses (this is relaxed in Section 2.3).
Our assumptions make use of several stylized facts. First, the revenue-shares are typ-
ically not negotiable in practice, and second, the major digital platforms appear to use a
one size ts all approach for all content providers both within and across the product
categories they participate in. Apple, for instance, uses the same 70/30-split for all services
regardless of whether it delegates retail pricing decisions to the upstream content providers
or not. See the discussion in the Introduction (in particular footnote 3) and Isaacson (2011).
2.1 When will the agency model lead to higher prices?
We now compare the case in which both downstream rms delegate retail pricing to the
upstream rms (adopt the agency model) to the case in which both set their own prices.
In the next subsection we endogenize the choice of whether to adopt the agency model.
There we allow for an asymmetric outcome where only one of the two platforms does so.
In the no-delegation case, downstream rm is optimization problem is given by
max
p1i ;p
2
i
Di: (3)
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The system of rst-order conditions, i = 1; 2, that characterizes the Bertrand equilibrium
in this case can, for a given si; be written as
@Di
@p1i
= si

p1i
@q1i
@p1i
+ q1i + p
2
i
@q2i
@p1i

= 0; (4)
@Di
@p2i
= si

p2i
@q2i
@p2i
+ q2i ++p
1
i
@q1i
@p2i

= 0: (5)
In contrast, in the delegation case (both downstream rms adopt the agency model),
upstream rm js optimization problem is given by:
max
pj1;p
j
2
Uj: (6)
It follows that the system of rst-order conditions, j = 1; 2, that characterizes the Bertrand
equilibrium in this case can, for a given s1 and s2, be written as
@Uj
@pj1
= (1  s1)
 
pj1
@qj1
@pj1
+ qj1
!
+ (1  s2)
 
pj2
@qj2
@pj1
!
= 0; (7)
@Uj
@pj2
= (1  s1)
 
pj1
@qj1
@pj2
!
+ (1  s2)
 
pj2
@qj2
@pj2
+ qj2
!
= 0: (8)
We presuppose that a unique equilibrium exists in both cases. For existence, we assume
that the demands xji are smooth whenever positive, that the Jacobian of the demand system
is negative denite, and that each rms prot is quasi-concave in its choice variables. For
uniqueness, we assume that own e¤ects dominate the sum of the cross e¤ects on prots.13
There are several di¤erences between conditions (4) and (5) and conditions (7) and (8).
Note rst that since si is the same for both goods, and enters (4) and (5) multiplicatively,
equilibrium prices without delegation do not depend on whether si and s i are the same or
di¤erent. In contrast, with delegation (when the upstream rms control the retail prices),
equilibrium prices are independent of the revenue-sharing splits if and only if si = s i.14
Lemma 1When the downstream rms control the prices (no delegation), equilibrium retail
prices are independent of revenue shares. When the upstream rms control the prices
(delegation), equilibrium retail prices are independent of si and s i if and only if si = s i.
13Thus, we assume that @
2Uj
(@pji )
2
+ j @2Uj
@pji@p
j
 i
j+ j @2Uj
@pji@p
 j
i
j+ j @2Uj
@pji@p
 j
 i
j < 0 for the case in which the upstream
rms control the retail prices, and @
2Di
(@pji )
2
+ j @2Di
@pji@p
j
 i
j+ j @2Di
@pji@p
 j
i
j+ j @2Di
@pji@p
 j
 i
j < 0 for the case in which the
downstream rms control the retail prices. See the extended discussion in Vives (1999), pp. 148-154.
14This can be seen by noticing that a simple division of the left and right-hand sides of (7) and (8) by
1  si does not eliminate the left-hand sidesdependence on si and s i when si di¤ers from s i.
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Note second that when the upstream rms set the prices, upstream rm js marginal
protability of increasing pj1 is decreasing in s2 (because
@qj2
@pj1
> 0 when consumers perceive
the downstream rms as imperfect substitutes). This means that for a given s1, the optimal
pj1 taking all other prices as given, will be lower the higher is s2 (for a given s2, the optimal
pj2 taking all other prices as given will be lower the higher is s1). Conversely, upstream
rm js marginal protability of increasing pj2 is increasing in s2,
15 which means that for a
given s1, the optimal p
j
2 taking all other prices as given will be higher the higher is s2 (for
a given s2, the optimal p
j
1 taking all other prices as given will be higher the higher is s1).
It follows from these implications that if, for example, si increases (i.e., Di opts to
keep a larger share of the revenue for itself), then U js incentive for a given s i is to sell
relatively more of its good through Dis rival and thus less through Di. It can do this either
by raising the price of good j at Di by more than it raises the price of good j at Dis rival,
lowering the price of good j at Dis rival by more than it lowers the price of good j at Di,
or by both raising the price of good j at Di and lowering the price of good j at Dis rival.
These ndings, as well as other implications and di¤erences, are summarized in the
following lemma. We have (see Appendix for the proofs of all Lemmas and Propositions):
Lemma 2 When the downstream rms control the prices (no delegation), all retail prices
will be the same in equilibrium (i.e., pji = p
 j
i and p
j
i = p
j
 i for all si, s i). When the
upstream rms control the prices (delegation), retail prices in equilibrium will be such that
 pji = p ji for all si;
 pji = pj i if si = s i;
 pji   pj i > 0 if and only if si > s i.
 pji   pj i is increasing in si .
Lemma 2 implies that in both cases, the prices at a given downstream rm will be the
same in equilibrium. When there is no delegation, the prices across the two downstream
rms will also be the same. However, when there is delegation, the prices across the two
downstream rms will be the same if and only si = s i. If these shares are not the same,
then the rm whose revenue share is higher will have higher retail prices. Moreover, the
15Note that the second term in (8) must be negative because the rst term, @qj1=@p
j
2, is positive.
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di¤erence between the two rmsprices will be increasing in si (an increase in si will cause
U j to modify its prices so as to stimulate sales through D i relative to Di).
Having shown that the maximization problems in (3) and (6) can lead to di¤erent
outcomes when si di¤ers from s i, we now show that the maximization problems in (3)
and (6) can lead to di¤erent outcomes even when si = s i.16 The reason is that even when
revenue shares are the same, the upstream and downstream rms focus on di¤erent things.
When the downstream rms choose prices (no delegation), each cares more about stealing
business from its rival than about whether a particular sale holding prices equal comes from
good 1 or 2. In contrast, when the upstream rms choose prices (delegation), each cares
more about the sales of its good versus its rivals good than about where its good is sold.
This has implications for setting prices. In the no-delegation case, for example, condi-
tions (4), (5), and their analogs imply that in equilibrium, the unique price p satises"
p
@qji (p)
@pji
+ qji (p)
#
+ p
@q ji (p)
@pji
= 0; (9)
whereas in the delegation case (both rms adopt the agency model), when s1 = s2, condi-
tions (7), (8), and their analogs imply that in equilibrium, the unique price p satises"
p
@qji (p)
@pji
+ qji (p)
#
+ p
@qj i(p)
@pji
= 0: (10)
Let p = p denote the solution to (9) and p = paa denote the solution to (10), and dene
p  (p; p; p; p) and paa  (paa; paa; paa; paa) to be the corresponding vectors of
equilibrium prices (here aadenotes both downstream rms adopting the agency model).
Then, it is straightforward to see by comparing (9) and (10) that the following must hold:
Proposition 1 When si = s i, equilibrium retail prices in the two cases are
 the same with and without delegation if @q
j
 i(p
)
@pji
=
@q ji (p
)
@pji
;
 lower with delegation than without delegation if @q
j
 i(p
)
@pji
<
@q ji (p
)
@pji
;
 higher with delegation than without delegation if @q
j
 i(p
)
@pji
>
@q ji (p
)
@pji
.
16This case is especially of interest because the revenue-sharing splits that have been observed in practice
have thus far all been the same or very similar for the di¤erent downstream platform providers (perhaps
in part because each recognizes that it would be disadvantaged if it were to assess a larger share for itself).
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Proposition 1 states that if si = s i, then retail prices will be higher with delegation
than without delegation if and only if there is more substitution at the downstream level
(as measured by the price sensitivity of consumers between downstream rms) than at the
upstream level (as measured by the price sensitivity of consumers between goods). Formally,
@qj i(p
)
@pji
measures the impact on the demand for good j at D i when Dis price on good
j changes (substitution between downstream rms), and @q
 j
i (p
)
@pji
measures the impact on
the demand for U js good at Di when Dis price on good j changes (substitution between
goods). Retail prices will be higher with delegation if and only if the former is greater.17
In practice, where the downstream platforms typically sell thousands of goods, the
substitution between platforms may exceed the substitution between goods for some pairs
of goods, but not for other pairs. In this case, we would expect to see higher retail prices
on the former pairs and lower retail prices on the latter pairs when the upstream rms
control the prices vis a vis when the downstream rms control the prices. It follows that
even when delegation on average leads to higher or lower retail prices, the direction of the
pricing changes need not be uniform across all goods for markets that are broadly dened.
The intuition for Proposition 1 is that when the downstream rms control the prices,
they do a good job of internalizing the substitution between goods on their respective
platforms, but succumb to head-to-head competition between themselves for the patronage
of consumers. When consumer loyalty between retailers is relatively low, this can lead to
erce competition and result in low prices for consumers. In contrast, when the upstream
rms control the prices (delegation), the substitution between platforms is internalized,
but the rms compete to get consumers to buy their good over their rivals good. This too
can lead to low prices for consumers, but only when the goods are perceived to be close
substitutes. Thus, by giving control over prices to the upstream rms, the downstream
rms can e¤ectively trade one type of externality (substitution between downstream rms)
for another type of externality (substitution between goods). As a result, prices can be
higher or lower in the delegation case depending on the relative strengths of substitution.
When the substitution between downstream rms is relatively high, the joint prots of
the downstream rms will increase by transferring control to the upstream rms. When
17The ndings in Proposition 1 would hold even if the revenue-sharing splits in the delegation case were
di¤erent from the revenue-sharing splits in the no-delegation case, as long as si = s i in the delegation
case. This is because retail prices in the no-delegation case do not depend on the revenue-sharing splits.
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the substitution between goods is relatively high, the downstream rmsjoint prots will
increase by retaining control of the retail prices for themselves. These implications follow
because equilibrium retail prices in both cases (with and without delegation) will generally
be below the level that maximizes industry prots. When both rms choose the business
format that induces the higher (symmetric) retail prices, therefore, both can move closer
to the industry prot maximum. In the absence of mitigating factors (e.g., cost di¤erences
that might arise from implementing di¤erent formats) to suggest otherwise, this implies:
Corollary 1 When si = s i, industry prots will be higher with delegation than without
delegation if and only if competitive pressures are greater downstream than upstream.
In this paper, competitive pressures are measured by the ease with which consumers are
willing to substitute between goods (upstream) and between retailers (downstream). More
generally, we would expect the same insights to extend to settings in which the factors
that a¤ect the competitive pressures upstream and downstream are more nuanced.18 The
general idea is that delegating pricing control to the level at which the competitive pressures
are weaker would be expected, all else being equal, to result in higher industry prots.19
2.2 When will the agency model be adopted?
We now allow the downstream rms to decide whether to delegate control of the pricing
decisions to the upstream rms (use the agency model) or to retain control for themselves.
Although many factors likely a¤ect these decisions in practice (e.g., one side may have
better information about demand, or there may be a perceived need to maintain upstream
incentives to innovate, etc.),20 here we focus solely on the pricing e¤ects of the downstream
18For example, in the sale of e-books, e-book publishers might face less competitive pressure to set lower
prices than they would otherwise if they also sell printed books (i.e., substitutes). And a rm that sells
both e-books and e-book readers (i.e., complements) might be inclined to charge lower prices than they
would otherwise if they only sold e-books. An accurate assessment of the actual competitive pressures
faced by the upstream and downstream rms would need to take these additional factors into account.
19We say all else being equal because the presumption in Proposition 1 and Corollary 1 is that the
downstream rms have the same revenue-sharing splits. If they do not, for example, if si > s i, then it is
possible for industry prots to be higher in the delegation case than in the no-delegation case even when
competitive pressures are higher upstream (this can happen, for example, if Dis setting of si > s i causes
the prices at both downstream rms to increase relative to what they would be if Di were to set si = s i).
20We discuss some of these other factors in the conclusion. We simply note here that if, for example,
the upstream rms are better informed about the demand for their goods than the downstream rms, or if
creating incentives for upstream innovation are important, then delegating pricing control to the upstream
rms might make sense for the downstream rms even if competitive pressures are stronger upstream.
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rmsdecisions. One might therefore expect the agency model to be adopted in our setting
when it would lead to higher retail prices (and hence higher industry prot), but not when
it would lead to lower retail prices. As we will now show, however, this intuition is incorrect.
For there to be an equilibrium in which none or both downstream rms adopt the agency
model, it must be that no rm would unilaterally want to deviate to a mixed regime in
which only one rm delegates retail pricing. Before proceeding, therefore, it is useful to
characterize what must be true of equilibrium prices if a mixed regime were to occur.
Without loss of generality, we consider the mixed regime in which only Di adopts the
agency model. In this case, D i decides p1 i and p
2
 i, U
1 decides p1i , and U
2 decides p2i . We
assume that all prices are chosen simultaneously. The maximization problems are thus
max
p1i
U1; max
p2i
U2; (11)
and
max
p1 i;p
2
 i
D i : (12)
From (11) and (12), we obtain the system of rst-order conditions that must be satised
in equilibrium. The two conditions that arise from D is problem are analogous to those
already given in (4) and (5). The two conditions that arise from U1 and U2s problem are
analogous to those already given in (7) and (8). Our assumptions imply that an equilibrium
in this mixed regime exists and is unique (and therefore that these conditions are su¢ cient).
The assumed symmetry between goods and between rms implies that if U1 and U2s
prices are such that p1i = p
2
i , then D i would set p
1
 i = p
2
 i, and vice versa. Thus, it follows
that the retail prices at each downstream rm will be the same in equilibrium. This in turn
implies that the four conditions that characterize the unique equilibrium in this regime can
be reduced to just two conditions, one that determines pji and one that determines p
j
 i.
(1  si)
 
pji
@qji (p)
@pji
+ qji (p)
!
+ (1  s i)
 
pj i
@qj i(p)
@pji
!
= 0: (13)
pj i
@qj i(p)
@pj i
+ qj i(p) + p
j
 i
@q j i (p)
@pj i
= 0; (14)
Here we see that although the solution to (14) is independent of si and s i, the solution
to (13) is not, unless si = s i. It follows therefore that unless si = s i, the equilibrium
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retail prices in this case will depend on both si and s i, just as we found for the case in
which both rms adopt the agency model. Moreover, the comparative statics are similar.21
We are now able to compare equilibrium prices across the di¤erent cases and regimes.
Let pa1 , p
a
2 denote the unique pair of prices that solves (13) and (14) when i = 1, and
dene pa  (pa1 ; pa1 ; pa2 ; pa2 ) to be the corresponding vector of equilibrium prices in the
mixed regime in which only D1 has the agency model.22 Then, recalling that p = p solves
(9) and p = paa solves (10) when si = s i, we can rank the equilibrium prices as follows:
Lemma 3 When si = s i, equilibrium retail prices are such that
 paa = pa1 = pa2 = p if @q
j
 i(p
)
@pji
=
@q ji (p
)
@pji
;
 paa < pa1 < pa2 < p if @q
j
 i(p
)
@pji
<
@q ji (p
)
@pji
;
 paa > pa1 > pa2 > p if @q
j
 i(p
)
@pji
>
@q ji (p
)
@pji
.
Lemma 3 implies that the equilibrium prices in the mixed regimes will be bounded
on one side by the equilibrium prices that arise when both rms adopt the agency model
and on the other side by the equilibrium prices that arise when neither rm adopts the
agency model. Equilibrium retail prices in the mixed regimes will be lower than when both
rms delegate, and higher than when neither rm delegates, for instance, if the degree of
substitution between downstream rms exceeds the degree of substitution between goods.23
The intuition for this result can best be seen by looking at Figure 1, where the price at
downstream rm 1 is on the horizontal axis, and the price at downstream rm 2 is on the
vertical axis. Per Lemma 3, we have assumed that s1 = s2, and we have assumed that the
substitution between downstream rms is greater than the substitution between goods.24
In this gure, BR2(p
j
1) represents the locus of prices p
j
2 that satisfy (14) if downstream
rm 2 does not adopt the agency model, and BR1(p
j
2) represents the corresponding the
locus of prices pj1 for downstream rm 1. The intersection of these best-reply curves occurs
at the price pair (p; p), where p = p is the unique price in the no-delegation case.
Similarly, BRa1(p
j
2) represents the locus of prices p
j
1 that satisfy (13) when downstream rm
21We show in the Appendix that pji , p
j
 i, and p
j
i   pj i will be increasing in si and decreasing in s i.
22Note that pai depends on s1 and s2. The arguments have been suppressed for ease of exposition.
23Analogous relationships hold for the mixed regime in which only D2 adopts the agency model.
24Analogous intuition holds for the setting in which the degree of substitution is greater upstream.
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1 adopts the agency model, and BRa2(p
j
1) represents the corresponding locus of prices p
j
2
for downstream rm 2. The intersection of these best-reply curves occurs at the price pair
(paa; paa), where p = paa is the unique price in the delegation case (both downstream rms
adopt the agency model). For the regime in which only D1 delegates retail pricing, the
solution occurs at the price pair (pa1 ; p
a
2 ), which is where the best-reply curve BR

2(p
j
1)
intersects BRa1(p
j
2) (here, prices p
a
1 and p
a
2 correspond to the unique pair of prices that
solves (13) and (14) when only D1 adopts the agency model). In this case, U1 and U2
charge the same price pa1 on D1s two products, and D2 sets a common price p
a
2 on its two
products. Lemma 3 then follows in this setting because, as can be seen, paa > pai > p
.
Figure 1
When s1 is not equal to s2, prices in the mixed regimes (and also in the case where
both rms adopt the agency model) will be a¤ected. Nevertheless, we would expect them
to continue to be bounded by the equilibrium prices in the no-delegation case on the one
hand and the prices that would arise in equilibrium in the case where both rms adopt the
agency model on the other hand, as long as s1 and s2 are not too far apart. For our next
result, therefore, we only require that s1 and s2 be su¢ ciently close together that the rank
orderings in Lemma 3 are unchanged, and we assume without loss of generality that if only
one downstream rm adopts the agency model, it will be D1. We also dene paa1 and p
aa
2
to be the unique pair of prices that solve (7) and 8), given that pji = p
 j
i , and note that
the corresponding vector of equilibrium prices in this regime is paa  (paa1 ; paa1 ; paa2 ; paa2 ). It
thus follows from Lemma 2 that paa1 = p
aa
2 = p
aa if s1 = s2 and that paai > p
aa
 i if si > s i.
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The following proposition describes what can be said in general:
Proposition 2 Suppose there is an initial stage of the game in which the downstream rms
simultaneously and independently choose whether to adopt the agency model. Then,25
 if the equilibrium retail prices in the various subgames are such that paai < pai < p,
the unique equilibrium outcome is for neither rm to adopt the agency model;
 if the equilibrium retail prices in the various subgames are such that paai > pai > p,
there are settings in which each outcome can arise in equilibrium. The outcome need
not be unique, and there may be no equilibrium in which the agency model is adopted.
To prove the rst bullet point, note that if the unique equilibrium outcome is for neither
rm to adopt the agency model, then it must be that neither rm unilaterally wants to
delegate control over its retail prices to the upstream rms. Or, in other words, it must be
that D1(p)  D1(pa) and D2(p)  D2(pa). This is indeed the case, as we can
see by forming the di¤erence for D1 (analogously for D2) and making a simple substitution:
D1(p
)  D1(pa) = 2s1
 
pq11(p
; p; p; p)  pa1 q11(pa1 ; pa1 ; pa2 ; pa2 )

(15)
 2s1
 
pq11(p
; p; p; p)  pa1 q11(pa1 ; pa1 ; p; p)

> 0:
The rst inequality in (15) follows because D1 and D2 are substitutes and retail prices in
this case are highest in the subgame where neither rm adopts the agency model. The last
inequality follows because p11 = p
2
1 = p
 maximizes D1s prot when D2 sets p12 = p
2
2 = p
.
No other outcome can arise in this case because to support a mixed regime in which
only D1 adopts the agency model, it must be that D1(pa)  D1(p)  which we have
just shown fails to hold. And, to support an outcome in which both D1 and D2 adopt the
agency model, it must be that D1(paa)  D1(pa) and D2(paa)  D2(pa)  which we
can show must also fail to hold using reasoning similar to the reasoning from above.26
We prove the second bullet point in the Appendix, but note here that when prices are
such that paai > p
a
i > p
, one might conjecture that both rms would always adopt the
25If s1 = s2, then, per Proposition 1 and Lemma 3, a necessary and su¢ cient condition for the rst bullet
point to hold is that the degree of substitution must be greater upstream, and a necessary and su¢ cient
condition for the second bullet point to hold is that the degree of substitution must be greater downstream.
26Note that D1(paa) D1(pa) is less than or equal to D1(paa1 ; paa1 ; pa2 ; pa2 ) D1(pa1 ; pa1 ; pa2 ; pa2 ),
which is less than zero because p11 = p
2
1 = p
a
1 maximizes D1s prot when its rival sets p
1
2 = p
2
2 = p
a
2 .
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agency model. This is not true. Proposition 2 implies that there may be equilibria in
which neither rm adopts the agency model, and there may be no equilibrium in which the
agency model is adopted. The reason is that neither rm may want to be the only one to
adopt the agency model. We can see from (15), for example, that if paai > p
a
i > p
, the
rst inequality would be reversed, but the second inequality would still hold. This would
imply that a downstream rms gain from being the only one to adopt the agency model
would be greater than some amount which is negative  which does not tell us much.
It turns out that there are settings in which all three outcomes  zero, one, or both
rms adopting the agency model  can arise in equilibrium in this case. We label the
pricing equilibria that correspond to these outcomes as points A, B, and C, respectively,
in Figure 2 below. Under some conditions, the outcome depicted in point A, where neither
rm adopts the agency model, may be the only outcome that can arise in equilibrium.
Figure 2
This last result can be understood intuitively by noting that there are countervailing
forces to consider when a downstream rm, sayD1, is deciding whether to adopt the agency
model. On the one hand, by adopting the agency model, D1 can induce the retail prices at
D2 to increase (which positively impacts D1s prot because D1 and D2 are substitutes).
This is depicted by the up arrow in Figure 2 for the case in which onlyD1 adopts the agency
model. On the other hand, by adopting the agency model, D1s prices will be chosen to
maximize a di¤erent objective function than what D1 would have maximized. This hurts
D1 because, as can seen, U1 and U2s chosen prices will be too high (i.e., greater than
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BR1(p
j
2)) in the sense that they will be higher than what D1 would have chosen for the
same pj2 if instead it had retained control. This is depicted by the right arrow in Figure 2.
Whether the former e¤ect (a higher induced pj2) will be viewed as outweighing the latter
e¤ect (a price pj1 that is too high given D2s price p
j
2), and thus whether D1 will nd the
tradeo¤ to be worth making depends on demand. Nevertheless, some intuition is possible.
The greater would be the induced increase in pj2, the more likely it is that D1 unilaterally
will want to adopt the agency model (or refrain from dropping it) all else being equal.
Consider, for example, the case in which the upstream goods are independent (no
upstream substitution). Delegating pricing upstream in this case leads to monopoly pricing
on both goods, and industry prot is maximized. If the substitution between platforms is
high, the induced increase in prices that arises when both rms adopt the agency model will
be high, and neither rm will want to deviate.27 But if the substitution between platforms
is low, so that the downstream rms would also set relatively high prices if instead they
retained control of the pricing, the induced increase in prices that arises when both rms
adopt the agency model will be low, and deviating may then be protable. Indeed, as
we show in the proof of Proposition 2, the unique outcome in this case (no upstream
substitution, low downstream substitution) may be for no rm to adopt the agency model.
2.3 What is the role of MFN clauses?
We have shown that the agency model might not be adopted by the platforms even when
industry-wide adoption would unambiguously increase retail prices and prots. We now
show that MFN clauses may be used to nudge the industry toward adoption in these cases.
We model an MFN clause, when imposed by Di, as requiring that U j set p
j
i  pj i
whether or not it also controls pj i. To analyze this, we continue to assume that all prices
are set simultaneously, and to account for the possibility that D i might set lower retail
prices than U j anticipates, we further assume that pji will adjust automatically to satisfy
the MFN clause in the (out-of-equilibrium) event that the constraints fail to hold initially.
WhetherDis MFN clause will have any e¤ect on U js choices in this setting will depend,
of course, on whether it would be binding in equilibrium. It need not be. Even without
27One might expect to the contrary that the temptation to deviate from the agency model would be
particularly strong if downstream substitutability is very high, with a strong business-stealing e¤ect. The
reason this intuition fails to hold is because the deviation can be observed prior to the setting of prices.
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an MFN clause, Dis prices might be lower than D is prices if, for example, si  s i and
substitution is greater upstream than downstream. In other settings, however, the MFN
clause would be binding (e.g., if si  s i and substitution is instead greater downstream).
To see what prices can be supported in equilibrium when Dis MFN clause is binding,
consider rst the case of a mixed regime in which only Di adopts the agency model (D i
retains control over its pricing). Note rst that because of Dis MFN clause, D i cannot
undercut U js retail prices. Any attempt to do so would only force U j to follow suit with
its own price cut. Such a strategy would therefore be protable for D i only for retail
prices that were above the industry prot-maximizing price, which we denote by p = pI .
Note next that for any price pj i = p^ set by D i such that the left-hand-side of (13)
would be negative when evaluated at pji = p^ (i.e., when the best reply of U
j is to set pji < p^
when all other prices are equal to p^), the upstream rms would want to undercut D is
price and would be free to do so. Note nally that for any price pj i = p^ set by D i such
that the left-hand-side of (13) would be positive when evaluated at pji = p^ (i.e., when the
best reply of U j is to set pji > p^ when all other prices are equal to p^), the upstream rms
would ideally want to charge higher retail prices but would be forced by Dis MFN clause
to match D is lower price. It follows that if p = pm denotes the retail price that solves
(13) when all retail prices are the same (note that pm is a function of s1 and s2; when
si = s i, then pm = paa, and when si > s i, then pm > paai > p
aa
 i), then the smaller of p
I
and pm is the highest retail price that can be supported in equilibrium with MFN clauses.
Other prices, however, can also be supported. For example, equal prices in the neighbor-
hood below pm can also be supported when pm  pI because at these prices, the upstream
rms would ideally like to set higher retail prices but are constrained by Dis MFN clause,
and D i will not nd it protable to deviate because although it would ideally like to set
lower retail prices, this would only cause the upstream rms to reduce their prices as well.
The following lemma describes what can be said in general:
Lemma 4 In the mixed regime in which only Di adopts the agency model and has an MFN
clause that prohibits U1 and U2 from setting higher prices at Di than are set at D i,
 Dis MFN clause will have no e¤ect on prices if si  s i and @q
j
 i(p
)
@pji
<
@q ji (p
)
@pji
;
 Dis MFN clause will have an e¤ect on prices if si  s i and @q
j
 i(p
)
@pji
>
@q ji (p
)
@pji
. In
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this case, the retail prices that arise in equilibrium will be the same for both down-
stream rms, and any price p 2 [p;minfpm; pIg] can be supported in equilibrium.
There are multiple equilibria in this regime because when Dis MFN clause binds, a
kink point is created in the best replies of the upstream rms and D i. The upstream
rms cannot set higher prices than D i sets, and D i knows this. The clause thus works
to mitigate D is incentive to set low prices. At the same time, however, if D i anticipates
that the upstream rms will set relatively low prices, then it may be optimal for D i also
to set relatively low prices, and the relatively low prices may then become self-supporting.
Figure 3
Figure 3 illustrates the equilibrium outcomes for the mixed regime in which only Di
adopts the agency model, si = s i, and substitution is greater downstream than upstream.
The black boldface line illustrates the multiple equilibria from the second bullet in Lemma
4. At the lower bound of what can be supported when Di has an MFN clause, retail prices
are at (p; p), the same as if Di had not adopted the agency model. In all other outcomes,
however, retail prices are strictly higher. The same is true when si > s i and the degree of
substitution is greater downstream. It follows, therefore, that adopting the agency model
and having an MFN clause in this case is a best response for Di (it is a strict best response
for all but the least advantageous outcome) when D i does not adopt the agency model.
This leads to our rst main result of this subsection. At least one rm will adopt the
agency model when Pareto optimality is used to select among equilibria, provided that
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conditions are such that industry-wide adoption would increase retail prices and industry
prots. This follows because p = minfpm; pIg > p in the Pareto-optimal equilibrium of
the mixed regime in which only Di adopts the agency model and Di has an MFN clause.
We can further extend our results by noting that the pricing outcome is unique when
both downstream rms adopt the agency model and at least one rm has an MFN clause.
The reason is that the upstream rms then control the retail prices of their goods at both
locations and thus can satisfy their MFN clause(s) without having to anticipate the prices
of an independent retailer. In these settings, if only Di has an MFN clause, then U j will
choose pji and p
j
 i to maximize its prot subject to p
j
i  pj i. And if both Di and D i have
MFN clauses, then U j will choose pji and p
j
 i to maximize its prot subject to p
j
i = p
j
 i.
When the constraints imposed by the MFN clause(s) are binding, the rst-order con-
ditions, j = 1; 2, that characterize the Bertrand equilibrium when both downstream rms
adopt the agency model and at least one rm has an MFN clause can be written as
@Uj
@pji
jpj i=pji = (1  si)
 
pji
 
@qji
@pji
+
@qji
@pj i
!
+ qji
!
+
(1  s i)
 
pji
 
@qj i
@pji
+
@qj i
@pj i
!
+ qj i
!
= 0: (16)
Solving these conditions to obtain the equilibrium pji and p
 j
i yields a surprising implica-
tion. If U j is setting p ji = p
 j
 i = p
aa, then the best U j can do is also to set pji = p
j
 i = p
aa
(recall that paa is the price that solves (10)), and vice versa. This suggests that when the
MFN clause(s) are binding (as they will be if both Di and D i have MFN clauses, or if only
Di has an MFN clause and si  s i), the upstream rms lose their ability to disadvantage
a downstream rm that has a higher revenue share. Thus, unlike in the delegation case
without MFN clauses, with binding MFN clauses, the unique outcome when both rms
adopt the agency model calls for all prices to equal paa, whether or not si is equal to s i.
This leads to our second main result of this subsection. In any equilibrium in which
at least one downstream rm adopts the agency model and has a binding MFN clause,
retail prices on all products will be at least as high as paa. This result does not depend on
whether Pareto optimality is used to select among equilibria in the subgames with MFN
clauses. It holds because if Di adopts the agency model and imposes an MFN clause, then
D i can ensure that the unique equilibrium price vector in the continuation game will be
p = (paa; paa; paa; paa) by also adopting the agency model and having an MFN clause.
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It remains to consider whether and under what conditions equilibria exist in which at
least one rm adopts the agency model and has a binding MFN clause. The following
proposition summarizes our results thus far and describes what can be said in general:
Proposition 3 Suppose the downstream rms can simultaneously and independently choose
whether to delegate retail pricing (adopt the agency model) and have an MFN clause. Then,
if the substitution between downstream rms is greater than the substitution between goods,
 there exists an equilibrium in which at least one rm adopts the agency model and
has an MFN clause. In every such equilibrium, retail prices are the same and equal
to paa when si = s i, and the same and greater than or equal to paa when si > s i;
 there exists an equilibrium in which Di adopts the agency model and has an MFN
clause, and retail prices are the same and strictly exceed maxfpaai ; paag when si > s i;
 there does not exist an equilibrium in which neither rm adopts the agency model if
Pareto optimality is used to select among equilibria in the mixed-regime subgames.
It follows from Proposition 3 that MFN clauses can have signicant e¤ects when they
are binding. If, for example, substitution is greater downstream, and Pareto optimality is
used to select among equilibria in the mixed regimes in which only one rm adopts the
agency model and has an MFN clause, then there is no equilibrium in which neither rm
adopts the agency model. Not adopting the agency model when the rival rm does not
adopt the agency model ensures that equilibrium prices in the continuation game will be
p, whereas by adopting the agency model and imposing an MFN clause, a deviating rm
can ensure that equilibrium prices in the continuation game will be higher. An MFN clause
can thus ensure that at least one rm will nd it protable to adopt the agency model.
We can also see from Proposition 3 that MFN clauses can a¤ect equilibrium prices.
This occurs in some well-dened settings. When si = s i and the degree of substitution is
greater downstream, it occurs when the equilibrium in the absence of MFN clauses is for
either zero or one rms to adopt the agency model. In the rst instance, retail prices in
the continuation game are given by p = (p; p; p; p), and in the second instance, they
are given by p = (pa1 ; p
a
1 ; p
a
2 ; p
a
2 ) if only D1 adopts the agency model. In both instances,
the retail prices are strictly less than paa (see Lemma 3). It follows from Proposition 3,
therefore, that MFN clauses would lead to strictly higher retail prices in these settings.
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MFN clauses can also lead to higher retail prices when si > s i and the degree of
substitution is relatively greater downstream. In this setting, we know from Proposition 3
that an equilibrium in which Di adopts the agency model and has an MFN clause exists,
and that retail prices on all products in this equilibrium are the same and strictly greater
than maxfpaai ; paag. For example, using Pareto optimality to select from among equilibria
in the mixed regimes, it is straightforward to show that such an equilibrium exists and that
the equilibrium retail prices in this case are equal to minfpm; pIg > maxfpaai ; paag. The
conclusion that MFN clauses can lead to higher retail prices in this case then follows on
noting that maxfpaai ; paag is the maximum price that can arise in equilibrium otherwise.
2.4 Revenue-sharing splits
We have thus far assumed that s1 and s2 are exogenous. This has simplied things because
it has allowed us to focus on our three questions of interest (namely, (i) when will the
agency model lead to higher prices, (ii) when will the agency model be adopted, and (iii)
what is the role of MFN clauses) without worrying about whether the rmsrevenue shares
might depend on the choices made. More importantly, however, our assumption that s1
and s2 can be taken as exogenous (or, equivalently, determined prior to the downstream
rmsdelegation decisions) accords with what we have observed in practice. When Apple
was entering the market for apps, for example, and deciding whether to adopt the agency
model, it employed the same 70/30 revenue-sharing split it was using for music. Similarly,
when Apple was entering the market for e-books and deciding whether to adopt the agency
model, it took the same 70/30 revenue-sharing split it was using for music (where it did
not delegate its pricing) and apps (where it did delegate its pricing) and imposed it on
the book publishers. When they resisted and tried to obtain better terms, Apple cited its
70/30 revenue-sharing split in both music and apps as a precedent and refused to give in.28
One can, of course, make s1 and s2 endogenous by allowing the downstream rms to
choose what revenue-sharing splits to o¤er. In this case, in principle, we would expect
the downstream rms to take into account some of the factors we have been considering
(e.g., that the upstream rms may be incentivized to disadvantage a downstream rm
28This is evident in the judges decision in the recent e-books case (see footnote 3). For example, after
noting that HarperCollins, a large book publisher, suggested that Apple take a 20% (rather than a 30%)
commission, the judge wrote (p. 58) Apple refused to budge. This was the same commission it charged
in the App Store ... The 30% commission was ultimately adopted across all of Apples nal Agreements..
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that has a higher revenue share than its rival). However, we would also expect their
choices to depend in practice on factors that are outside of the model (such as the need
to encourage innovation).29 It follows that while adding a stage to our model  with its
built-in symmetry  might allow us to predict that the revenue-shares will be the same for
both platforms, it would not allow us to assess the magnitudes of the splits with condence.
Nevertheless, we can o¤er a few insights. First, even abstracting from any xed costs, we
would not expect the upstream rms to be left with zero surplus (despite the downstream
rms having all the bargaining power). If one downstream rm were o¤ering a split of
0/100, the rival downstream rm could protably deviate by o¤ering the upstream rms a
small positive share, thereby inducing them to stop supplying its rival (no content provider
would supply a platform that was o¤ering nothing if it took away sales from a platform that
was o¤ering something). This implies that the upstream rms must earn positive surplus.
Second, we would expect the upstream rmssurplus to be increasing in the substitution
between platforms. It follows from Lemma 2 and the expressions in (13) and (14) that if
at least one rm adopts the agency model, a downstream rm that tries to keep a larger
revenue share for itself will be disadvantaged (an increase in si will cause U j to modify its
prices so as to stimulate sales through D i relative to Di). Faced with a rival platform that
was o¤ering a 70/30 split, a platform that o¤ered only a 65/35 split, for example, would
have to be concerned not only about possibly being foreclosed from the market entirely,
but also about being partially foreclosed from the market, in the sense that its expected
sales would be less than they would have been if its revenue split had also been 70/30.30
Third, as mentioned above, we have abstracted from the need to encourage innovation,
and taken the number and quality of the upstream rms goods as given. In practice,
however, content providers must have some expectation of reward if they are to invest their
time, energy, and know-how into creating quality products that have value for consumers.
Moreover, the creation of content is inherently uncertain and not without risk. For these
29The need to encourage innovation may help to explain why the revenue splits in practice are 70/30 (in
favor of the upstream rms) as opposed to, for example, 30/70 (in favor of the downstream rms).
30A platform may be able to mitigate this tradeo¤ by having an MFN clause in its contract. This
would allow it to keep a larger share of the revenue for itself without having to worry about being partially
foreclosed. However, an MFN clause in combination with a higher revenue share would not prevent content
providers from refusing to supply the platform, and it may have the e¤ect of discouraging innovation, which
the platform may not want to do. In contrast, our focus has been on showing that MFN clauses can play
an important role even if they have no e¤ect on the revenue-sharing splits. Furthermore, as we emphasized
above, Apples motivation for adopting MFN clauses in the e-books market does not seem to have been to
increase its share of the pie (they used the same 70/30 split for e-books as they did for music and apps).
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reasons, we would expect both the number and quality of the upstream innovations to be
increasing in the share of the revenue the upstream rms receive (assuming, as seems real-
istic, that investment decisions are made after the revenue-sharing splits are determined).
Once again there would be pros and cons of o¤ering a 65/35 split versus a 70/30 split.
The trade-o¤ facing the platforms in each instance is thus a familiar one: is it better
to have a larger share of a smaller prot pie, or a smaller share of a larger prot pie? We
would expect the revenue shares that arise in equilibrium to account for these tensions.
3 Conclusion
This paper has analyzed the competitive e¤ects of the agency model in a market structure
with both upstream and downstream competition and interlocking relationships. We found
that the agency model can lead to higher or lower prices for consumers depending in part on
whether the revenue-sharing splits of the downstream platforms are the same or di¤erent,
and on whether the substitution is greater between goods or between platforms. We also
found that even if industry-wide adoption of the agency model would lead to higher retail
prices and prots for all rms, there may be equilibria in which it is not universally adopted,
or in which it is not even adopted at all. There is thus a prisoners dilemma aspect to agency
model adoption. Lastly, we found that MFN clauses can be used in such settings to induce
rival platform providers both to adopt the agency model and to set higher retail prices.
It should be noted that in deriving our results, we have, in addition to taking the number
and quality of the upstream goods as given, also abstracted from issues of asymmetric
information and uncertainty in our analysis. In doing so, we have kept the focus on the
rmspricing decisions and how these decisions would be expected to impact the adoption
of the agency model all else being equal. We recognize, however, that it can only provide a
partial depiction of the complex forces that typically govern relationships in these markets.
Our analysis thus complements existing literature, which focuses on some of these other
forces, albeit at the expense of some of the forces that we consider. Many of the papers in
this literature suggest other motivations for why the agency model might be adopted. For
example, it has been noted that the upstream content providers may be better informed
than the downstream platform providers about the market potential for their goods. In
such cases, one might expect there to be e¢ ciency gains from letting the content providers
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determine the retail prices (see Foros, Kind and Hagen, 2009). Hagiu and Wright (2013)
analyze the e¢ cient choice of business format when rms engage in non-contractible mar-
keting activities (however, they abstract from pricing issues and do not focus on the agency
model per se). Gans (2012) considers the hold-up problem that may arise if consumers must
undertake specic investments in order to have platform access prior to the upstream rms
choosing prices. In the market for e-books, it has been suggested that there may be a neg-
ative externality from e-books to printed books (see Abhiskek et al., 2012). Letting the
publishers decide on the retail prices allows them to internalize this negative externality.
Other authors, however, point to externalities that may work against transferring retail
pricing control to the upstream content providers. Content in the form of music, apps
and e-books, for example, are complementary products to tablets and smartphones. Such
complementarities would, all else being equal, work in favor of retail prices being determined
by the platform providers (see Gaudin and White, 2013, for a discussion of these issues).
In short, there are likely to be many forces that a¤ect the adoption of the agency
model in practice, and more work is surely needed to understand their e¤ects. Within this
broader context, our contribution to the extant literature is to highlight the role played by
MFN clauses in the rmsadoption decisions, and to emphasize, among other things, the
importance of the relative substitution patterns between goods and between platforms.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2: The conclusion that all prices will be the same when the downstream
rms control prices follows from the fact that the rms and the goods are symmetrically
di¤erentiated, and noting that the solution to (4), (5), and their analogs does not depend
on revenue shares. The rst bullet point follows from the fact that since the goods are
symmetrically di¤erentiated, each upstream rm will set the same retail price for Di. The
second bullet point follows from the fact that since the downstream rms are symmetrically
di¤erentiated, each upstream rm will set pji = p
j
 i when si = s i. The third bullet point
follows from the rst two bullet points and the fact that pji   pj i is increasing in si.
It remains only to show that pji   pj i is increasing in si. To see that this holds, note
that because the goods are symmetrically di¤erentiated, each upstream rm will set the
same retail price for Di in equilibrium. This means that p
j
1 = p
 j
1 and p
j
2 = p
 j
2 . Therefore,
let p1 denote the common price at retailer 1 and p2 denote the common price at retailer
2. The four rst-order conditions that characterize the Bertrand equilibrium in the agency
model (i.e., (7) and (8), j = 1; 2) can therefore be reduced to the following two conditions:
(1  s1)

p1
@q11
@p11
+ q11

+ (1  s2)

p2
@q12
@p11

= 0; (A.1)
(1  s1)

p1
@q11
@p12

+ (1  s2)

p2
@q12
@p12
+ q12

= 0: (A.2)
We can dene best-reply curves as follows. Let p1 = BRa1(p2; s1; s2) be the solution to (A.1)
and p2 = BRa2(p1; s1; s2) be the solution to (A.2). Then, it must be that in equilibrium,
retail prices satisfy p1 = BRa1(BR
a
2(p1; s1; s2); s1; s2) and p2 = BR
a
2(BR
a
1(p2; s1; s2); s1; s2).
Consider rst the equilibrium p1. Taking the derivative with respect to s2 yields
@p1
@s2
=
@BRa1
@p2

@BRa2
@p1
@p1
@s2
+
@BRa2
@s2

+
@BRa1
@s2
: (A.3)
Rearranging this yields
@p1
@s2
=
@BRa1
@p2
@BRa2
@s2
+
@BRa1
@s2
(1  @BRa1
@p2
@BRa2
@p1
)
: (A.4)
Now consider the equilibrium p2. Taking the derivative with respect to s2 yields
@p2
ds2
=
@BRa2
@p1

@BRa1
@p2
@p2
@s2
+
@BRa1
@s2

+
@BRa2
@s2
: (A.5)
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Rearranging this yields
@p2
@s2
=
@BRa2
@p1
@BRa1
@s2
+
@BRa2
@s2
(1  @BRa2
@p1
@BRa1
@p2
)
: (A.6)
Using (A.6) and (A.4), we note that the sign of @p2
@s2
  @p1
@s2
is the same as the sign of
@BRa2
@p1
@BRa1
@s2
+
@BRa2
@s2
 

@BRa1
@p2
@BRa2
@s2
+
@BRa1
@s2

; (A.7)
which can be rewritten as
1  @BR
a
1
@p2

@BRa2
@s2
 

1  @BR
a
2
@p1

@BRa1
@s2
: (A.8)
Using the fact that j@BRa1
@p2
j < 1, j@BRa2
@p1
j < 1, @BRa2
@s2
> 0, and @BR
a
1
@s2
< 0, it then follows that
the sign of (A.8) is positive. This establishes that pji   pj i is increasing in si. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1: We have shown in the text that in the no-RPM case, conditions
(4), (5), and their analogs imply that in equilibrium, the unique price p will satisfy
p
@qji (p)
@pji
+ qji (p) + p
@q ji (p)
@pji
= 0; (A.9)
whereas when both rms adopt the agency model and revenue shares are the same, condi-
tions (7), (8), and their analogs imply that in equilibrium, the unique price p will satisfy
p
@qji (p)
@pji
+ qji (p) + p
@qj i(p)
@pji
= 0: (A.10)
In each case, the price vector p is evaluated at the same four prices: p = (p; p; p; p).
As in the text, let p = p denote the solution to (A.9) and dene p  (p; p; p; p)
to be the vector of equilibrium prices. Then, by the denition of p, it follows that
p
@qji (p
)
@pji
+ qji (p
) + p
@q ji (p
)
@pji
= 0: (A.11)
Evaluating the left-hand side of (A.10) at p = p for all i; j, and using (A.11) yields
p
 
@qj i(p
)
@pji
  @q
 j
i (p
)
@pji
!
; (A.12)
which can be either positive, negative, or zero, depending on the sign of
@qj i(p
)
@pji
  @q ji (p)
@pji
.
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The three bullet points in Proposition 1 follow immediately on noting that our assump-
tions imply that the left-hand side of (A.10) is decreasing in p when p = (p; p; p; p). Thus,
for example, if the sign of (A.12) is positive, then the left-hand side of (A.10) is positive
at p = p, implying that p = p is less than the (symmetric) equilibrium RPM price, and
if the sign of (A.12) is negative, then the left-hand side of (A.10) is negative at p = p,
implying that p = p is greater than the (symmetric) equilibrium RPM price. Q.E.D.
Comparative Statics for the Mixed Regime: In the mixed regime in which Di adopts
the agency model, the four rst-order conditions that characterize the Bertrand equilibrium
can be reduced to the following conditions, one to determine pj i and one to determine p
j
i :
pj i
@qj i(p)
@pj i
+ qj i(p) + p
j
 i
@q j i (p)
@pj i
= 0; (A.13)
(1  si)
 
pji
@qji (p)
@pji
+ qji (p)
!
+ (1  s i)
 
pj i
@qj i(p)
@pji
!
= 0: (A.14)
Let pj i = BR

 i(p
j
i ) be the solution to (A.13) and let p
j
i = BR
a
i (p
j
 i; si; s i) be the solution
to (A.14). Then, it must be that in the equilibrium of the mixed regime in which Di has
RPM, retail prices satisfy pj i = BR

 i(BR
a
i (p
j
 i; si; s i)) and p
j
i = BR
a
i (BR

 i(p
j
i ); si; s i).
We now show that pji , p
j
 i, and p
j
i   pj i will be increasing in si and decreasing in s i.
Consider rst the equilibrium pji . Taking the derivative with respect to si yields
@pji
@si
=
@BRai
@pj i
@BR i
@pji
@pji
@si
+
@BRai
@si
: (A.15)
Rearranging this yields
@pji
@si
=
@BRai
@si
1  @BRai
@pj i
@BR i
@pji
 : (A.16)
Our assumptions on uniqueness imply that @BR
a
i
@pj i
and
@BR i
@pji
are less than one in absolute
value. It follows that the sign of @p
j
i
@si
will be the same as the sign of the numerator in (A.16),
which is positive because the direct e¤ect of an increase in si is to increase p
j
i .
Next, consider the equilibrium pj i. Taking the derivative with respect to si yields
@pj i
@si
=
@BR i
@pji
 
@BRai
@pj i
@pj i
@si
+
@BRai
@si
!
: (A.17)
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Rearranging this yields
@pj i
@si
=
@BR i
@pji
@BRai
@si
1  @BR i
@pji
@BRai
@pj i
 : (A.18)
Our assumptions on uniqueness imply that
@BR i
@pji
and @BR
a
i
@pj i
are less than one in absolute
value. It follows that the sign of
@pj i
@si
will be the same as the sign of the numerator in
(A.18), which is positive because best-response curves are upward sloping and @BR
a
i
@si
> 0.
It remains to establish that the di¤erence pji   pj i is increasing in si. Using (A.16) and
(A.18), we note that the sign of @p
j
i
@si
  @p
j
 i
@si
will be the same as the sign of

1  @BR i
@pji

@BRai
@si
.
Using the fact that j@BR i
@pji
j < 1 and @BRai
@si
> 0, it follows that this sign is indeed positive.
Proof of Lemma 3: We rst establish the relationship between the equilibrium prices
in any mixed regime. We then show that when s1 = s2, these prices are bounded by the
equilibrium prices in the RPM and no RPM cases, respectively, as stated in Lemma 3.
When s1 = s2, the two conditions that characterize the Bertrand equilibrium in the
mixed regime when only Di adopts the agency model, (14) and (13), simplify to:
pj i
@qj i(p)
@pj i
+ qj i(p) + p
j
 i
@q j i (p)
@pj i
= 0; (A.19)
pji
@qji (p)
@pji
+ qji (p) + p
j
 i
@qj i(p)
@pji
= 0: (A.20)
Let pj i = BR

 i(p
j
i ) be the solution to (A.19). Then, using the denition of p
, the fact
that BR i(p
j
i ) is increasing in p
j
i , and j@BR

 i
@pji
j < 1, we have (i) for pji = p, pji = BR i(pji ),
(ii) for all pji < p
, pji < BR

 i(p
j
i ) < p
, and (iii) for all pji > p
, pji > BR

 i(p
j
i ) > p
.
Thus, to establish that pji = p
j
 i, we need only establish that
@qj i(p
)
@pji
=
@q ji (p
)
@pji
implies
that in equilibrium pji = p
. To establish that pji < p
j
 i, we need only establish that
@qj i(p
)
@pji
<
@q ji (p
)
@pji
implies that in equilibrium pji < p
. And, to establish that pji > p
j
 i,
we need only establish that
@qj i(p
)
@pji
>
@q ji (p
)
@pji
implies that in equilibrium pji > p
. But
this is precisely what we found in the proof of Proposition 1 when we evaluated the left-
hand side of (A.10) (which is same as (A.20) above) at p = (p; p; p; p), and showed
that it was either zero, negative, or positive depending on the sign of
@qj i(p
)
@pji
  @q ji (p)
@pji
.
In particular, we found that when
@qj i(p
)
@pji
=
@q ji (p
)
@pji
, the left-hand side of (A.20) is
zero when evaluated at p = (p; p; p; p). This means that the pji that solves (A.20)
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given pj i = p
 is equal to p, and thus in equilibrium we know that pji = p
. When
@qj i(p
)
@pji
<
@q ji (p
)
@pji
, the left-hand side of (A.20) is negative at p = (p; p; p; p). This
means that the pji that solves (A.20) given p
j
 i = p
 is less than p, and thus in equilibrium
we know that pji < p
 (since pji will only further decrease when p
j
 i decreases). Lastly,
when
@qj i(p
)
@pji
>
@q ji (p
)
@pji
, the left-hand side of (A.20) is positive at p = (p; p; p; p).
This means that the pji that solves (A.20) given p
j
 i = p
 is greater than p, and thus in
equilibrium we know that pji > p
 (since pji will only further increase when p
j
 i increases).
Having previously established the relationship between paa and p, and having just
established the relationship between pa1 and p
a
2 (and also between p
a
1 and p
a
2 ), it thus
remains only to establish the relationship between paa and pa1 and between p
a
2 and p
.
Consider rst the relationship between paa and pa1 . When s1 = s2, the conditions that
characterize the Bertrand equilibrium when only Di adopts the agency model are given by
(A.19) and (A.20). Evaluating them at p = (paa; paa; paa; paa), we see that the left-hand
side of (A.20) is zero (recall that p = paa is the price that solves (10)), but the left-hand side
of (A.19) may be zero, negative, or positive depending on the sign of
@qj i(p
aa)
@pji
  @q ji (paa)
@pji
.
If
@qj i(p
aa)
@pji
=
@q ji (p
aa)
@pji
, then the left-hand side of (A.19) is zero when evaluated at
p = (paa; paa; paa; paa), which implies that paa = pa1 = p
a
2 is the unique solution to (A.19)
and (A.20). If
@qj i(p
aa)
@pji
<
@q ji (p
aa)
@pji
, then the left-hand side of (A.19) is positive when
evaluated at p = (paa; paa; paa; paa). This means that the pj i that solves (A.19) given
pji = p
a is greater than paa, and thus in equilibrium we know that pa1 > p
aa (since the
optimal pji will then increase when p
j
 i increases). And, nally, if
@qj i(p
aa)
@pji
>
@q ji (p
aa)
@pji
,
then the left-hand side of (A.19) is negative when evaluated at p = (paa; paa; paa; paa). This
means that the pj i that solves (A.19) given p
j
i = p
aa is less than paa, and thus in equilibrium
we know that pa1 < p
aa (since the optimal pji will then decrease when p
j
 i decreases).
Now consider the relationship between pa2 and p
. Evaluating (A.19) and (A.20) at
p = (p; p; p; p), we see that the left-hand side of (A.19) is zero, but the left-hand side
of (A.20) may be zero, negative, or positive depending on the sign of
@qj i(p
)
@pji
  @q ji (p)
@pji
.
If
@qj i(p
)
@pji
=
@q ji (p
)
@pji
, then the left-hand side of (A.20) is also zero when evaluated
at p = (p; p; p; p), which implies that p = pa1 = p
a
2 is the unique solution to
(A.19) and (A.20). If
@qj i(p
)
@pji
>
@q ji (p
)
@pji
, then the left-hand side of (A.20) is positive
when evaluated at p = (p; p; p; p). This means that the pji that solves (A.20) given
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pj i = p
 is greater than p, and thus in equilibrium we know that pa2 > p
 (since the
optimal pj i will increase when p
j
i increases). And, nally, if
@qj i(p
)
@pji
<
@q ji (p
)
@pji
, then the
left-hand side of (A.20) is negative when evaluated at p = (p; p; p; p). This means
that the pji that solves (A.20) given p
j
 i = p
 is less than p, and thus in equilibrium we
know that pa2 < p
 (since the optimal pj i will decrease when p
j
i decreases).
Noting that the sign of
@qj i(p
aa)
@pji
  @q ji (paa)
@pji
is the same as the sign of
@qj i(p
)
@pji
  @q ji (p)
@pji
(this is a consequence of the denition of p as the price p that solves (9) and of paa as
the price p that solves (10), and our assumption that the left-hand sides of (9) and (10)
are decreasing in p), and using the results from Proposition 1 and Lemma 3, we have thus
shown that (i) if
@qj i(p
)
@pji
=
@q ji (p
)
@pji
, then paa = pa1 = p
a
2 = p
, (ii) if
@qj i(p
)
@pji
<
@q ji (p
)
@pji
,
then paa < pa1 < p
a
2 < p
, and (iii) if
@qj i(p
)
@pji
>
@q ji (p
)
@pji
, then paa > pa1 > p
a
2 > p
.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: The proof of the rst bullet point is in the text. To prove the
second bullet point, we construct a linear-demand example that is similar to the one used
by Rey and Verge (2010) to show that (i) there are settings in which each outcome can
arise in equilibrium, (ii) the equilibrium outcome need not be unique, and (iii) for some of
these settings, there is no equilibrium outcome in which the agency model is adopted.
Let the demand for good j at platform i be given by
qji = 1 
 
pji   dpj i   up ji   dup j i


;
where
  1  d  u  du > 0:
Then, in the no-delegation case (neither rm adopts the agency model), we have:
p =

+ (1  u) ;
 =
2s(1  u)
[+ (1  u)]2 : (A.21)
In the delegation case (both rms adopt the agency model), we have, for s1 = s2 = s:
paa =

+ (1  d) ;
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aa =
2s(1  d)
[+ (1  d)]2 : (A.22)
And in the mixed regime in which only D1 delegates, we have, for s1 = s2 = s:
pa1 = 
(d+ 3(1  u)  ) and pa2 = 
(3  2u  );
where 
 = [(2 + u2) (2  d2)  3u (2 + d2)] 1 : Prots in this regime are
a1 = 2s

2 ((2 + d)+ d (1 + 5u)) (d+ 3(1  u)  ); (A.23)
a2 = 2s

2 (1  u) ((3  2u)  )2 : (A.24)
To support a Nash equilibrium in which neither rm adopts the agency model, it must
be that    a1  0. Equations (A.21) and (A.23) imply that
   a1 = (d  u)
0BBB@(d  u)  d2pa1 ((1  u) + )4
 (1 + u) 2 (1  u)3| {z }
+
1CCCA 2s4 (1  u)3
2((1  u) + )2| {z }
+
: (A.25)
From (A.25) we see that (   a1 ) > 0 if (d  u) < 0: We thus have a Nash equi-
librium in which no rm adopts the agency model if upstream substitution is greater than
downstream substitution. If (d  u) > 0; then deviation may or may not be protable
depending on the sign of the term in brackets. Other things equal, it is more likely to be
protable if (d  u) is relatively small. In particular, note that in the limit u = 0 we have
(   a1 )ju=0 =
d2 (1  d)2
(2  d2) (2  d)2 s > 0: (A.26)
To support a Nash equilibrium in which both rms adopt the agency model, it must be
that aa   a2  0. Equations (A.22) and (A.24) imply that
aa   a2 = (d  u)
0BBB@ d2 (2 + u) (1 + u)
 (1  u) (2  u)2| {z }
+
  (d  u)
1CCCA 2s (1  u) (2  u)2 
2((1  d) + )2| {z }
+
: (A.27)
Equation (A.27) shows that deviation from the agency model is protable if (d  u) < 0:
In combination, equations (A.25) and (A.27) thus show that we have a unique equilibrium
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in which neither rm adopts the agency model. However, if (d  u) > 0; then deviation
may or may not be protable depending on the sign of the term in brackets. If the sign of
the bracketed term is positive, then deviation is unprotable. Other things equal, the sign
is more likely to be positive if (d  u) is relatively small. For u = 0 we have
(aa   a2 )ju=0 =  d2
1  d  d2
2 (2  d2)2 s > 0; (A.28)
Thus, deviation is unprotable in this case if d > dcrit = 1
2
 p
5  1  0:62:
Taken together, (A.26) and (A.28) thus imply that for u = 0; we have a unique equi-
librium in which neither rm adopts the agency model if d < dcrit; while for dcrit < d < 1
we have multiple equilibria; one where both adopt, and one where neither adopts.
Figure 4 illustrates the possible equilibria for all relevant parameter values. If u > d
we have a unique equilibrium in which neither rm adopts the agency model. The curve
uaa solves (aa   a2 ) = 0. Above this curve, no rm will unilaterally deviate from the
agency model (given that u < d). In contrast, the curve u solves (   a1 ) = 0. Below
this curve no rm will unilaterally adopt the agency model. Between the curves uaa and
u, we thus have a region in which both or neither adopting the agency model can arise.
Figure 4
It follows that (i) if u  d or u < uaa, then the unique equilibrium is for neither rm to
adopt the agency model; (ii) if u  d and uaa  u  u, then there are multiple equilibria
(either both adopt the agency model, or neither adopts the agency model); and (iii) if u  d
and u > u, then the unique equilibrium is for both rms to adopt the agency model.
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To support a mixed regime in which only D1 adopts the agency model, it must be that
a1   1  0 and a2   aa2  0. We show that both relationships can occur if s2 is
su¢ ciently large relative to s1. The proof of this last claim is available on request.Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4: We have shown (see Lemma 3) that even in the absence of Dis MFN
clause, U1 and U2 would set pji < p
j
 i in equilibrium when the conditions in the rst bullet
point in Lemma 4 are satised. Hence, Dis MFN clause would have no e¤ect in equilibrium
in this case. However, we also showed in Lemma 3 that when the conditions in the second
bullet point in Lemma 4 are satised (i.e., si  s i and @q
j
 i(p
)
@pji
>
@q ji (p
)
@pji
), Dis MFN
clause would be binding (because otherwise U1 and U2 would set pji > p
j
 i in equilibrium).
Thus, in this case, it must be that all four prices are the same in any equilibrium.
We now show that no vector of prices ~p  (~p; ~p; ~p; ~p) can be supported in equilibrium
if ~p is greater than minfpm; pIg or less than p. Consider rst the case in which ~p >
minfpm; pIg. In this case, either D i would want to deviate by undercutting ~p, knowing
that this would force U1 and U2 to match its price cuts, or U j would want to deviate by
undercutting ~p. In the rst instance, this follows because if ~p > minfpm; pIg = pI , then
by deviating to p1 i = p
2
 i = p
I and having U1 and U2 match its prices, D i would earn
D i(pI) > D i(~p)). In the second instance, this follows because if ~p > minfpm; pIg = pm,
then the left-hand side of (13) is negative when all prices are equal to ~p (recall that (13) is
satised with equality when all prices are equal to pm)). Now consider the case in which
~p < p. In this case, D i would want to deviate by charging a higher price on its goods.
This follows because the left-hand side of (14) is positive when all prices are equal and less
than p (recall that (14) is satised with equality when all prices are equal to p).
Lastly, we show that the vector of prices ~p  (~p; ~p; ~p; ~p) can be supported in equilibrium
if ~p 2 [p;minfpm; pIg]. To see this, note that for all ~p in this set, U j would ideally want
to increase its price above ~p (this follows because for all ~p  pm, the left-hand side of
(13) is weakly positive when all prices are evaluated at ~p) but cannot do so because of the
MFN clause, and D i would ideally want to charge a lower price on its two goods (this
follows because for all ~p  p the left-hand side of (14) is weakly negative when all prices
are evaluated at ~p) but cannot do so without causing U1 and U2 to match its price cuts.
Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 3: We have already seen that if the degree of substitution is
relatively greater downstream, then retail prices will be the same on all products in any
equilibrium with MFN clauses. We now establish the rest of the rst two bullet points.
To prove that there exists an equilibrium in which at least one rm adopts the agency
model and has an MFN clause, suppose without loss of generality that si  s i, and
consider the candidate equilibrium in which Di has an MFN clause and only Di adopts the
agency model. Suppose that in the equilibrium of the continuation game, p = minfpm; pIg.
Then, it follows that if si = s i, p = paa, and if si > s i, p > maxfpaai ; paag. It also follows
that Dis prot is equal to Di(pm; pm; pm; pm) if pm  pI and Di(pI ; pI ; pI ; pI) if pm > pI .
To check for protable deviations, note that if Di does not adopt the agency model
in this case, it will earn Di(p; p; p; p), which is less than both Di(pm; pm; pm; pm)
and Di(pI ; pI ; pI ; pI). And, if it does adopt the agency model but does not have an MFN
clause, it will earn Di(pa1 ; p
a
1 ; p
a
2 ; p
a
2 ), which is also less than both Di(p
m; pm; pm; pm)
and Di(pI ; pI ; pI ; pI). It follows that Di does not have a protable deviation. Now con-
sider whether D i has a protable deviation. If it adopts the agency model it will earn
Di(p
aa; paa; paa; paa) whether or not it also has an MFN clause. But this too is less than
(or equal to) its prot in the candidate equilibrium. It follows that D i, like Di, does not
have a protable deviation, and thus the candidate equilibrium is indeed an equilibrium.
By construction, this establishes the second bullet point. To prove the rest of the rst
bullet point, we still need to show that in any equilibrium in which at least one rm adopts
the agency model and has an MFN clause, retail prices are the same and equal to paa when
si = s i, and the same and greater than or equal to paa when si > s i. But this is so
because we have already shown that retail prices cannot be the same and less than paa in
any equilibrium involving MFN clauses, nor can they be the same and greater than paa in
any equilibrium involving MFN clauses when si = s i (because pm = paa when si = s i).
To establish the third bullet point, we suppose without loss of generality that si  s i
and note that Pareto optimality implies that in any equilibrium in which Di has an MFN
clause and only Di adopts the agency model, retail prices will be the same on all products
and equal to p = minfpm; pIg in the continuation game. As in the discussion above, this
leads to a prot for Di of Di(pm; pm; pm; pm) if pm  pI and Di(pI ; pI ; pI ; pI) if pm > pI .
In either case, Dis prots are strictly greater than they would be if neither rm adopted
the agency model, which implies that Di would thus have a protable deviation. Q.E.D.
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